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Are you being served? Europeanizing
and re-regulating the single market
in services
Georg Menz
ABSTRACT While the freedom of service provision is one of the pillars of the
Single Market Project, such deregulation clashes with national wage regulation
and social policy-making. This article examines recent attempts by the European
Commission to further promote liberalization, epitomized in the so-called ‘Bolkes-
tein Directive’, as well as three case studies of political conflict involving the transna-
tional posting of workers within the framework of service liberalization in Ireland,
Sweden and Germany. Re-regulation of service provision by governments is crucially
affected by the lobbying efforts of trade unions and employers. Internal organiz-
ational characteristics of labour market interest associations are crucial in predicting
their effectiveness. The deregulatory effects are felt most severely in Germany, while
even in Sweden the former gentlemen’s agreement can no longer be sustained
without serious modification. In France, no conflict unfolded. In Ireland, a
business-friendly comprise emerges, whilst the European Union directive was
severely watered down, though not neutered.
KEY WORDS Bolkestein; employers; labour market policy; service liberalization;
single market; unions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent debates in comparative political economy have focused on the impli-
cations of economic liberalization in Europe. The influential varieties of
capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancke´ et al. 2007),
which rejected pessimistic predictions of convergence on the liberal Anglo-
American model of capitalism, has attracted criticism for allegedly not adequately
accounting for change (Pontusson 2005).
A major external driver of change that remains somewhat bereft of scholarly
attention is the European Union (EU) Single Market Programme (SMP). The
deregulatory liberal nature of the SMP clashes with, and in some cases directly
undermines, the pillars of politico-economic governance models by interfering
with national authority over labour market regulation. ‘Negative integration’
(Scharpf 1996) potentially weakens national regimes of wage-setting, labour
market regulation and access control regulation by permitting trans-European
service provision.
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This contribution examines the implications of EU-induced liberalization on
different models of capitalism, focusing on the impact of the liberalization of
service provision (LSP). In line with the VoC approach, it is argued that the
‘adjustment process will be oriented to the institutional recreation of competitive
advantage’ (Hall and Soskice 2001: 63). Thus, actors in various models will seek
to re-establish equilibrium and re-adjust the institutional logic of these models,
especially influenced by the industrial relations legacies. National actors will be
conditioned by the logic of legalistic, corporatist or voluntaristic labour market
regulation. However, moving beyond the somewhat static and path-dependent
prediction generated by VoC, it is argued that responses are also influenced by
the interests and institutional characteristics of unions and employers.
Empirically, the contribution examines recent advances in the liberalization
of service provision, especially the EU Services Directive, and subsequent
national response strategies. Owing to its methodological design and the
reliance on case studies, the ambition is not to prove decisively a causal relation-
ship, but rather to demonstrate linkages between institutional and ideational
factors and policy outcomes. The rest of the article is organized as follows:
the second section outlines the key arguments in more detail; the third
section explores the genesis of the Services Directive and empirical develop-
ments in Ireland, Sweden, Germany, and France; and a fourth concluding
section briefly assesses the validity of the argument presented and outlines the
main contributions to the literature.
2. THE DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL RESPONSES TO
EUROPEAN LIBERALIZATION
The European Commission has recently attempted to revive neglected aspects of
the single market, especially regarding service provision, one of the original ‘four
freedoms’ already embedded in the Treaty of Rome. On 13 January 2004, the
Commission presented the first draft of a Framework Directive for Services on
the Internal Market. Commonly referred to by the name of the Dutch Commis-
sioner for the Internal Market, Frits Bolkestein, the directive sought to curtail
national authority over access regulation for service companies and promote
trans-European service provision. ‘Services’ were defined fairly broadly in
Article Art. 2.4 (1) as comprising ‘any self-employed economic activity, as pro-
vided for by Art. 50 of the Treaty, consisting of the provision of a service against
consideration’. Excluded from the remit of the directive were services of general
economic interest and activities performed by the state without remuneration.
This implied that public services which do involve such charge, for example,
municipal libraries or swimming pools, could be covered. This definition of ser-
vices shall be adopted in this article.
The SMP permits transnational service provision, but behind the backdrop of
substantial wage gaps in the EU-27 this potentially leads to providers offering their
services based on significantly lower wages, unless legally barred from doing so.
Clever entrepreneurs are availing themselves of new outsourcing opportunities
972 Journal of European Public Policy
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by seconding employees transnationally and exploiting such wage gaps. In line
with Directive 96/71/EC (Art. 2), a ‘posted worker’ is defined as ‘a worker
who, for a limited period, carries out his work in the territory of a Member
State other than the State in which he normally works’. By formally registering
corporate headquarters in low-cost Latvia or Cyprus, significant savings can be
realized and the obligation to pay Irish or Swedish wages can be legally
avoided. This applies when and if the country of registration’s regulatory
regime applies to the transnational service provision even in the destination
country (‘country of origin principle’). Recent European Court of Justice decisions
have interfered with national regulation of transnational service provision.
Though warmly welcomed by economic liberals, any such liberalization of
service provision was bound to prove politically contested, for it touches
upon both the debates surrounding immigration and fears over social
dumping in an EU-27 with significant wage gaps. The first version of the
Services Directive sought to introduce the country of origin principle regarding
wages and other regulations.
By insisting on a new directive based on a radical interpretation of mutual
recognition (Nicolaidis and Schmidt 2007) and this country of origin principle,
the European Commission provoked powerful reactions by national govern-
ments, unions and employers. This article examines the national response
strategies both to the ‘Bolkestein’ directive itself and related legal developments.
It explores how four different countries, representing three different industrial
relations traditions, responded to this impetus.
The potential shock to the wage structure and the labour market was most acute
in north-western European countries with relatively high wages. Pan-European
service provision – especially at country of origin wage levels – would have
created a permanent second tier of the labour market, or at the very least led to
downward pressure on wages in services.
Building on earlier work (Menz 2005), it is argued that responses are broadly
shaped by the self-preserving logic implied by the VoC approach, according to
which the recreation of competitive advantage and restoration of past patterns
will be the predominant response pattern. System maintenance will be preferred
to radical paradigmatic change in reaction to EU-induced change. This can be
partly attributed to path dependency and high transaction costs, but is also a con-
sequence of the complementarities between systems of industrial relations and
other aspects of politico-economic systems of governance (Hall and Gingerich
2004). However, while the process of adjustment may well entail a period of
conflict and suboptimal outcomes, VoC do not specify the dynamics of such
conflicts, nor does the predicted eventual outcome of the re-establishment of a
system-affirming response appear inevitable. In fact, critics have highlighted the
tendency to downplay conflict, ignore politics and struggle with change as weak-
nesses of early VoC literature (Pontusson 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005).
The response to an external shock will we conditioned by the dominant logic
of labour market regulation; however, moving beyond the somewhat path-
dependent bias of VoC, it is argued that the nature of the national response
G. Menz: Are you being served? 973
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strategies will also be influenced by the interests of the unions and employers
respectively and their power resources. Following Menz (2005: 64ff.), the latter
are conceptualized in terms of degree of centralization (number of actors),
internal cohesion (top-down control), representation among clientele (member-
ship levels), and access to government (consultation). Extracting from the
relevant literature, and in the absence of quantitative values with the exception
of those for representation among clientele (presented in Table 1), values for
these variables are considered either ‘weak’, ‘medium’, or ‘strong’. These
values are presented in Table 2. The interests are derived from an analysis of
primary documents and interview data and are discussed in the third section.
The logic of labour market regulation (and industrial relations) varies greatly
across Europe. Three key categories can be distilled from the industrial relations
literature (Edwards 2003; Ferner and Hyman 1998; Traxler et al. 2001): a lega-
listic-statist logic, whereby wages are prescribed by law and even the results of
collective bargaining are endorsed and bestowed with legal character by the
ministry of labour; a neocorporatist logic, whereby wages are the exclusive
domain of competence for labour market interest associations and the state is
either legally barred from wage-setting or de facto not inclined to interfere
directly; and finally, a liberal-voluntaristic logic, whereby wages are set by
labour market interest associations either at micro or meso level, but low cover-
age of these agreements and opt-out clauses prevail.
These three different logics of industrial relations inform the case selection.
Liberal-voluntaristic logic coincides with market-based industrial relations
systems found in liberal market economies (LMEs), represented here by
Ireland. Legalistic-statist logic is found in the Mediterranean political economies
characterized as mixed market economies (MMEs), represented by France.
Neocorporatist logic is associated with co-ordinated market economies (CMEs).
However, CMEs and the neocorporatist logic are also potentially under most
stress from an external impetus for two reasons. Firstly, as wages are set through
bargaining and are not ex ante legally binding, there is no legally binding
minimum wage. Secondly, the ‘scramble for a response’ is more protracted than
in the other models because of the need for a response strategy acceptable to
both unions and employers, which even in the presence of ‘deliberative institutions
[to] facilitate . . . coordination’ (Hall and Soskice 2001: 65) is challenging. For
this reason, two cases are included, Sweden and Germany. Methodologically,
Table 1 Union and employer organisational density
Employers Unions
France 75 8
Germany 73 23
Ireland 38 35
Sweden 54 78
Sources: Traxler et al. (2001); OECD data cited in Ebbinghaus (2003).
974 Journal of European Public Policy
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measurement of variance among different politico-economic models of governance
is maximized.
In France, the trade unions are impeded by a low level of representation
among their clientele (eight per cent of the workforce). Analysts highlight a
low degree of organizational centralization owing to ideological divisions,
underdeveloped internal cohesion and problems in exercising control over the
rank and file, and underdeveloped links with the government (Lallement
2006; Mouriaux 1997). The employer association Medef represents primarily
large French business, but also organizes a significant number of small- and
medium-sized enterprises. Its centralization is much more strongly developed
and membership comprises 75 per cent of French business; however, divergent
interests limit internal cohesion (Woll 2006). Common socialization patterns
facilitate access to governmental actors (Hall 1986). The minimum wage
SMIC creates a floor and wages are routinely declared universally applicable
(etendu) and legally binding.
In Germany, the unitary union movement encompasses 23 per cent of the
workforce, and its internal coherence is low (Menz 2005). Sectoral unions,
especially the powerful metalworker union IG METALL and service sector
union ver.di, command strong power (Traxler et al. 2001). Access to govern-
ment is secured through informal ties to the Social Democratic Party and
formal hearings during legislative deliberations.
The employer camp is similarly represented by one association only, and
the BDA is also organizationally subdivided along sectoral and regional lines.
Membership levels reach 73 per cent, recent atrophy notwithstanding (Hassel
2007). The employers rely on strong sectoral members, especially in the
metal sector, and maintain informal contacts to the ministry of labour and
social affairs. Negotiated wages are binding on members of German employer
associations only. Recently, some employers have quit the association to
dodge such obligation.
Table 2 Power resources of Labour Market Interest Association
Internal Power Index Germany France Ireland Sweden
Unions Employers
Centralization strong–
strong
weak–
strong
weak–
medium
strong–
strong
Internal cohesion medium–
medium
weak–
medium
weak–
medium
strong–
strong
Representation among
clientele
medium–
strong
weak–
strong
medium–
medium
medium–
strong
Access to government medium–
medium
weak–
medium
medium–
medium
strong–
medium
Comparison medium–
strong
weak–
medium
weak–
medium
strong–
strong
G. Menz: Are you being served? 975
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In Ireland, the trade union movement organizes 35 per cent of the workforce;
most union members are concentrated in the public sector. Though most unions
are affiliated with umbrella organization ICTU, the movement is hampered by
persistent organizational subdivisions and low internal cohesion (von Prondzynski
1998). The institutionalization of social partnership has created new avenues for
informal consultation with government (Hardiman 2002).
Employer association IBEC comprises 38 per cent of all companies. It is more
centralized and internally cohesive than the unions (von Prondzynski 1998) and
regularly consulted by ministries, playing an active role in the social partnership.
Wages are negotiated sectorally and in some instances at the company level with
some guidance proffered by the national framework agreement. However, they
are binding only on the negotiating parties and deviations from this norm are
possible.
In Sweden, the trade union movement entails 78 per cent of the workforce, its
internal cohesion and centralization remains high despite the division into blue-
and white-collar employees (Kjellberg 1998), and access to the government is
principally secured through close ties to the Social Democratic Party.
The unitary employer federation Svenskt Na¨ringslivet organizes 54 per cent
of all companies and internal cohesion is generally guaranteed (Swenson
1991). Wages are negotiated sectorally, but employers generally adhere to
these terms, with no similar tendency of membership losses among employers
being discernible.
In sum, the organizational characteristics of unions and employer associations
in the four countries lead one to expect a particularly strong position for French
and Irish employers, a potential stand-off and compromise solution in Sweden
and a somewhat stronger position for German employers.
3. NEW INITIATIVES REGARDING THE LIBERALIZATION OF
SERVICE PROVISION (LSP)
Though originally already contained in Articles 59–66 of the Treaty of Rome
and one of the ‘four freedoms’, considerable legal uncertainty clouded trans-
European service provision and it remained of little practical significance well
into the 1980s. The relatively equal levels of wages in the then-EC meant
that transnational service provision only occurred in cases where highly specific
niche know-how had to be sourced internationally. De facto, European service
sectors remained well within the legal remit of national regulatory authorities.
EU activity was largely focused on banking and other financial services, as
evident in the 1977 and 1989 banking directives, establishing a one-stop
home country ‘passport’ for financial service providers. Somewhat vague
wording in the Treaty of Rome permitted particular protection of public
service domains, historically particularly cherished in France.
The Commission grew increasingly frustrated with this state of affairs. The
1990s had witnessed a substantial increase in transnational service provision,
especially in the construction sector. ‘Posted workers’ from low-wage southern
976 Journal of European Public Policy
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countries detached to high-wage destinations were heralded by economic liber-
als as an expression of the SMP, whilst critics perceived the emergence of islands
of foreign law that imported Portuguese wages to Germany as a nightmarish
neoliberal harbinger. A 1990 ECJ decision (Socie´te´ Rush Portuguesa Lda vs.
Office National d’Immigration 27 March 1990; C-118/89) clarified that
‘communal law does not oppose the practice of [member states] imposing
their legislation . . . on any person performing a paid service . . . on their terri-
tory’. However, EU eastward enlargements in 2004 and 2007 re-ignited this
problem and created much more substantial east–west wage gaps.
3.1. Bolkestein directive
In 1999, Dutch Liberal Frits Bolkestein became Commissoner of Internal
Market and Services. In a 2002 speech, he outlined his political views on the
goals of European integration, highlighting ‘removing obstacles, ‘solving
cross-border problems’ and ‘utilizing economies of scale’. No mention was
made of social policy (Kowalsky 2007: 32). Perhaps inspired by the Lisbon
Agenda of promoting economic growth largely through neoliberal deregulation
and Bolkestein’s previous activities on behalf of the Hayekian think tank Mont
Pelerin Society, the DG MARKT presented its draft directive on service dereg-
ulation on 13 January 2004, following an internal draft inventory of remaining
‘barriers’ to services. Little consulting of stakeholders was conducted and the
European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) was ignored altogether. The direc-
tive’s remit was extremely broadly defined.
The section containing the most political dynamite was Article 16, containing
the ‘country of origin’ principle regarding applicable contract law. Host country
wages and working conditions were applicable only where they constituted stat-
utory law and were thus part of the ordre public. Draft Articles 14 (3) and 24
outlawed existing obligations to carry appropriate wage and working conditions
documents and the requirement to appoint a national representative. Any new
administrative requirement introduced by national governments would become
subject to approval by the Commission (Art. 15 (6)). Article 15 further sought
to abolish quantitative, regional or financial restrictions.
Substantial political controversy ensued. In France, the response of employer
organization Medef was lacklustre. In its 6 April 2005 statement (Medef 2005),
the employers acknowledged social dumping potential and expressed concern
over the abolition of documentation requirements. The trade unions strongly
opposed the directive (CGT 2008), expressing their concerns to the govern-
ment. Though there was no direct potential for undercutting of wages, as
wages are legally enshrined, there was some concern over the practical ramifica-
tions of lax documentation requirements. During the first half of 2005, a vocif-
erous public debate over the merits of the Constitution unfolded, during which
the Bolkestein directive was invoked as representative of the neoliberal funda-
mentalism informing the European project (Le Monde 2005a). Desperate to
rescue an affirmative vote in the referendum, President Chirac proclaimed
G. Menz: Are you being served? 977
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that the directive ‘does not exist anymore’ (Le Monde 2005b: 5) in the original
form.
In Sweden, the trade unions insisted on the abolition of the country of origin
principle and Swedish wages and working conditions for posted workers (LO
2005). Their national level lobbying activities proved successful, with the
Swedish government assuming a very reserved stance towards Bolkestein.
Employer organization Svenskt Na¨ringslivet (2004) dismissed the social
dumping argument as ‘unfounded concerns’ and strongly supported the direc-
tive, yet did not insist on the country of origin principle. Generally, the directive
was seen as potentially compromising the neocorporatist logic of labour market
regulation.
In Germany, the trade union very vehemently opposed the directive and the
country of origin principle in particular. The head of DGB, Michael Sommer,
referred to the project in a speech during a demonstration in Berlin on 11
February 2006 as ‘madness’. The trade union also very strongly lobbied
against ending national enforcement of local labour standards and the coverage
of temporary work agencies in the directive and in favour of broader exemp-
tions, especially regarding health and education. The German government
proved open to these concerns and assumed a deeply sceptical stance. Chancellor
Schro¨der declared that ‘those willing to offer services in this country must be
willing to respect the criteria which we have developed in this country’ (Rheinische
Post 2005: 2). Even the employers were concerned about possible negative rami-
fications regarding national labour and health standards (BDA 2004) and
accepted that certain ‘contradictions’ regarding the rights of posted workers
seemed to exist and needed to be ‘clarified’ (BDA 2006: 2).
In Ireland, the government assumed a broadly supportive stance, partly
informed by employer positions. The liberalization of services was broadly
characterized as potentially beneficial for Irish companies. However, the Irish
Ferries case which attracted a lot of public attention demonstrated potential
negative ramifications. The trade unions were very strongly opposed to the
directive, portraying it as a ‘Frankenstein directive’ that would set in motion
a downward spiral in wages and working conditions (SIPTU 2006). The
employer association IBEC supported the directive as a reduction of unnecess-
ary restrictions and considered the fears over social dumping misplaced. The
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment organized a number of
consultation exercises with the social partners, receiving the positions of both
unions and employers. Notwithstanding union reservations, the overall Irish
government position was broadly favourable towards the directive and the
employer position. The directive seemed to compliment or at least not challenge
the voluntarist mode of labour market regulation.
Significant concerns arose regarding this directive, perceived by many of the
national labour market interest associations as being excessively liberal, a pos-
ition clearly communicated to the respective national governments. Though
other factors obviously coloured the public debate, notably the poor timing,
the botched and incomplete consultation by the Commission, and a very
978 Journal of European Public Policy
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successful mobilization campaign by ETUC, the opposition by national trade
union associations and the lacklustre reception even among employer associ-
ations helped shape the national negotiation positions and in turn indirectly
influenced the Commission’s decision to withdraw the initial draft directive.
In light of the clearly and strongly expressed concerns, the German, Swedish
and French governments all decided to adopt a fairly critical stance towards
the directive and the country of origin principle in particular.
During the debates in the European Parliament it was once again this issue
which led to the most heated exchanges. A compromise between the major
two parliamentary groupings abandoned the home country principle, employ-
ing the term ‘freedom to provide services’. Host countries retained the right to
conduct monitoring exercises. A concession to the Left was the exclusion of
services of general interest, including healthcare. The Posted Workers Directive
(96/71/EC) would be incorporated as setting the basic framework for working
conditions. This meant that statutory wages and working conditions of host
countries became binding on posted workers. The amended proposal was pre-
sented by the Commission on 4 April 2006. The Austrian Presidency during the
first half of 2006 had played an important role in ensuring that voices critical of
Article 16 were being heard. Austrian Minister for Economic Affairs Bartenstein
had signalled in an interview that he would ‘fight for exceptions and exemptions’
(International Herald Tribune 2005: 3). One year to the day after the rejection
of the European Constitution in the French referendum, the Council of
Ministers accepted the Austrian compromise solution, akin to the Parliament’s
proposal. With the exception of one abstention from Lithuania, the approval by
the Council of Ministers was unanimous. The final result is the Directive on the
Single Market (2006/EC/123), which had to be implemented into national law
by 28 December 2009.
Aside from the nascent Services Directive, EU-induced liberalization also
spawned national conflicts over the (re)-regulation of labour markets and wages,
as the three following country studies will illustrate. Strikingly, no such conflict
emerged in France where the entire framework of wages is routinely declared
universally applicable and thus legally binding on all service providers. This
status quo is accepted by both the trade unions and employers (Interviews 1, 2).
3.2. Ireland
Concerned about ferocious competition pressures from low cost airlines, ferry
operator Irish Ferries announced in late 2005 that it was re-flagging its fleet,
outsourcing management to Cypriote subcontractor Dobson, and replacing
its workforce with Eastern European, predominantly Latvian, agency crew.
This proved a shrewd manoeuvre, as temporary restrictions on service provision
did not apply to Cyprus and Malta. The company claimed that Latvian hourly
wages, which stood at E3.60, with the minimum hourly wage in 2004 only at
E0.71, should be applicable to these ostensibly temporarily posted workers.
The Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU) and the
G. Menz: Are you being served? 979
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Seamen’s Union of Ireland (SUI) responded immediately and robustly with
industrial action. Management deployed security guards to assist the introduc-
tion of agency crew, leading to a number of violent confrontations and the
blocking of vessels in Irish and Welsh ports in December 2005. A major nation-
wide demonstration organized by the union on 9 December 2005 attracted a
turnout of 100,000, widely viewed as a considerable demonstration of strength
(Irish Independent 10 December 2005). However, despite the negative publicity
the company was courting, its management seemed unwilling to budge.
The conflict had commenced on the Rosslare–Cherbourg service as early as
2004, when the company had flagged out its vessel Normandy to the Bahamas,
announcing subsequently a lay-off of 700 employees (SIPTU 2004) and locking
out SIPTU-organized seafarers to apply additional pressure.
IBEC initially supported the company, arguing that greater flexibility for the
Irish labour market and new transnational corporate strategies were desirable.
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions was equally adamant about its rejection
of management actions in this case, arguing that the outsourcing strategy was
indicative of broader trends towards systematic undercutting of wages and
exploitation of migrant workers. Over the course of the year 2005, its irritation
grew, culminating in the temporary refusal to negotiate the new sixth social
partnership agreement, following the expiration of the 2003–2005 framework
‘Sustaining Progress’.
Following intensive negotiations at the Labour Relations Commission and
intervention of the National Implementation Body, a compromise agreement
was eventually found in late 2005. It accepted the planned outsourcing, but
safeguarded existing wages and working conditions for Irish crew members.
Crucial for unions was the concession to pay all employees the statutory Irish
minimum wage of E7.65 per hour and thus accept host country conditions.
Though ostensibly an agreement that ended wage dumping, its nature is
employer-friendly, as it permitted the effective de-unionization of a formerly
state-owned enterprise, significant wage cuts and the outsourcing to a
company incorporated abroad.
The response strategy is thus business-friendly and can be categorized as
liberal and voluntarist, merely entailing the application of minimum wages,
but not more exacting standards on companies posting employees to Ireland.
3.3. Sweden
When the Swedish town of Va¨xholm invited tenders for a school renovation
project in 2004, it received a highly attractive offer from Latvian construction
company Laval and Partneri, a vehicle established to carry out construction
work in Sweden using Latvian employees. Construction commenced in 2004,
with 14 employees posted directly from Latvia. A conflict over pay quickly
ensued between the sectoral construction union Svenska Byggnadsarbetarefo¨r-
bundet and the company. No collective wage agreement had been signed and
the company paid its workers an hourly wage of SEK 80, thus exceeding
980 Journal of European Public Policy
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standard Latvian wages, but still falling well short of local sectoral hourly wages
of SEK 130 to 145. The union justified its blockade of the building site on 2
November 2004 by reference to the 1991 Lex Britannica, according to which
industrial action can be taken to support foreign workers against foreign com-
panies active in Sweden even if said workers are bound by a valid foreign work
and wage contract. The Electricians’ Union (Svensk Eletrikerfo¨rbundet)
supported the blockade. The company demonstrated willingness to raise the
hourly wage to SEK 105, but refused to be bound by standard wages or sign
a Swedish collective wage agreement. Work on the site continued for a few
days, but eventually came to a halt on 14 December after the company had
exhausted cement supplies from non-unionized cement suppliers.
Unable to complete the job in time, with the school scheduled to open in June
2005, the company withdrew from the site and took legal action against the
union in the Swedish labour court (Arbetsdomstolen). For the first time ever,
the gentlemen’s agreement enshrined in the 1991 modification to the Swedish
Law on Co-determination was put to a serious practical test. An intriguing ques-
tion was whether the key component of this agreement – the right to impose a
blockade to ensure the payment of Swedish wages – was consistent with EU
law. The Swedish labour court felt that this issue could not be resolved domesti-
cally and referred the case to the ECJ. Having exhausted conflict resolution within
the neocorporatist framework, the conflict evolved into a legal case as the rules of
the game were contested given the involvement of a foreign company.
The ECJ 18 December 2007 Laval decision (C-341/05) declared industrial
action unlawful
where the negotiations on pay, which that action seeks to require an under-
taking established in another Member State to enter into, form part of a
national context characterised by a lack of provisions, of any kind, which
are sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not render it impossible
or excessively difficult in practice for such an undertaking to determine the
obligations with which it is required to comply as regards minimum pay.
Swedish business cheered the result (Svenskt Na¨rignslivet 2007), while the
union was exasperated. As Swedish wages are not legally binding and there is
no statutory minimum wage, the ECJ ruling opens up room for lower wage
tiers for foreign posted employees. However, following detailed inquiry and
consultation, the government will introduce legislation in April 2010
(Prop. 2009: 10/48) that modifies the Lex Britannica, rendering strikes in
support of posted workers possible only where their wages and working con-
ditions do not meet the standards of Swedish collective agreements. While
unions are concerned about limitations to the right to strike and the reduction
of applicable conditions to a minimum hard core, the employers wanted to
clarify this core and suggest the introduction of a minimum wage (EIRO
2009), a suggestion that was ignored. While strike rights have been curtailed,
the new legislation limits opportunities for undercutting wages and thus
represents a union-friendly response strategy.
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3.4. Germany
Outsourcing to East European subcontractors in the German meat processing
sector commenced in earnest in 2004, following EU eastward enlargement.
Regular employees were replaced with more than 15,000 posted Eastern Eur-
opeans, especially Romanians. Sectoral union Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststa¨tten
(NGG) even claimed 26,000 job losses (Czommer and Worthmann 2005).
Remunerated at hourly wage levels of three to five euros and thus well below
standard wage levels, the posting of workers offered the additional advantage
of circumventing regulations regarding holiday payment, sick pay and social
security contributions. In the absence of a national minimum wage, sectoral
wage agreements apply. Recent trends suggest that businesses are leaving
employer associations to avoid the legal obligations such agreements entail.
Thus, de facto wages in certain service sectors, especially private security, gas-
tronomy and personal care including coiffeuring, are truly minimal. In other
sectors, notably meat processing, there is no recognized employer association
and hence no applicable and legally binding sectoral minimum wage.
The sectoral subdivision of the union movement impaired timely and robust
responses akin to the Irish and Swedish. It lobbied both for the legislative intro-
duction of a statutory minimum wage and an extension of the existing legislative
national response strategy to cover additional sectors. This so-called Posted
Workers Act had been amended in 1999 to enable the Ministry for Labour
and Social Affairs to declare wages and working conditions universally appli-
cable even in the absence of employer consent.
While umbrella association BDA remained staunchly opposed on ideological
grounds to accept the introduction of a statutory minimum wage, some, though
not all, sectoral employer associations agreed to render their sectoral minimum
wage universally applicable (Interview 3). Between 2007 and 2008, a major
political battle between the union and employers ensued, which was
represented respectively by the Social Democratic Minister for Labour Olaf
Scholz and the Christian Social Minister for Economic Affairs Michael Glos
within the Grand Coalition. Both camps used their political access channels to
lobby actively in this matter. The long drawn-out battle ended in 2008, when a
two-tier legislative response strategy emerged: firstly, existing legislation will be
amended to permit sectoral minimum wages to be declared universally applicable
if at least 50 per cent of employees in the sector are covered by existing wage agree-
ments and both sectoral unions and employers agree to such measure. Secondly, a
modification of the 1952 Act on Minimum Working Conditions permits the cre-
ation of sectoral minimum wages even in sectors in which employer associations
either do not exist or possess very low levels of membership. No agreement
could be found on whether or not to permit such sectoral minimum wages for
the sector of temporary work agencies, where the sectoral employer association
remains fiercely opposed (personal communication to the author, 2 July 2008).
In the meantime, a second EU-induced liberalization avenue emerged. The
remarkable ECJ Ru¨ffert ruling struck down the obligation imposed on
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companies tendering for public bids in the Land of Lower Saxony entailed in the
Land’s public procurement directive to pay standard regional wages (Tariftreue).
In its very liberal ruling, the court found that ‘to impose on service providers
registered in one member state where minimum wages are lower an additional
economic burden which is likely to prohibit, inhibit or render less attractive the
service provision in the host country . . . can be considered a restriction in the
sense of Art. TEU 49’. This decision thus bans regional laws that go ‘beyond
. . . minimum protection’.
After long-winded political battles and considerable lobbying activity, the
amended legislative acts present a revamped version of the German national
response strategy, enabling the government to create sectoral minimum wages
based on the recommendations of a bipartisan expert commission on low
wages, to be modelled on the UK Low Pay Commission. Remarkably, this
creates fairly powerful legislative tools to introduce sectoral minimum wage
regulations in sectors affected by transnational service provision. However,
the Ru¨ffert decision has undercut supplementary regional re-regulation,
which will contribute to the bifurcation of wage structures.
4. CONCLUSION: VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, VARIETIES OF
RESPONSES
EU-induced liberalization has unleashed considerable conflicts over labour
market and wage (re-)regulation. In an EU-27 with significant wage gaps,
both the Services Directive and the general liberalization of LSP prove politically
contentious because they can undermine national sovereignty, creating islands
of foreign law and promoting wage and social dumping.
Employer associations generally welcomed the new services directive, but
many expressed concerns over distorted and unfair competition and henceforth
did not attempt to defend the home country principle. While the French labour
market regulation style allows no avoidance of standard wages, this emerged as a
concern among the neocorporatist CME cases of Sweden and Germany, while
in voluntarist Ireland such possibility was welcomed by the employers.
The national responses to the Services Directive reflect both the attempt to
safeguard existing patterns of labour market regulation associated with CMEs
and MMEs and the interests and power resources displayed by the employers
and unions. Thus, the Irish government embraced a business-friendly position,
while the Swedish, German and French governments were decidedly sceptical
and directly opposed to the country of origin principle. In the three latter
countries, the employers’ interests lay in liberalization but, unlike their Irish
counterparts, they did not embrace the home country principle. Union interests
focused on defending the status quo. Despite the employers’ superior organiz-
ational characteristics in France and Germany, their stance was guarded.
At the national level, the response strategies will be conditioned by the logic of
existing labour market regulation plus the outcome of political conflicts between
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unions and employers regarding the exact nature of the new equilibrium. This
claim is largely borne out by the evidence.
In Ireland, LSP has permitted new avenues for outsourcing by using posted
workers, in line with the aspirations of the organizationally superior employers
and the spirit of liberal voluntarism. Thus, the Irish Ferries case has been
resolved through a business-friendly solution that permits outsourcing, flexible
personnel policy and the payment of minimum wages.
In France, a legacy of legalistic industrial relations is reflected in wages that are
legally binding, permitting no room for the undercutting of wages. There
appears to be no such interest by the institutionally superior employers.
In Sweden, European liberalization challenged existing union rights and led
to unregulated spaces outside of the neocoporatist framework. Though the
initial response followed classic neocorporatist lines and the strong unions
were successfully able to stop the undercutting of wages, the involvement of a
foreign company induced ECJ activity. The impending Swedish legislation
will curtail strike rights, but clarify the applicability of standard wage conditions
to posted workers, thus reflecting the union interests and power resources.
The German case is particularly instructive. The response strategy reflects the
neocorporatist legacy. The superior organizational characteristics of German
employers have helped impede a general minimum wage despite union
advocacy. Yet new legislation permits sectoral minimum wages, of interest
where undercutting of wages through posted workers is not welcomed by
sectoral employers. Unlike the Swedish case, no comprehensive re-regulation of
the LSP was found originally, meaning sectors outside of construction were
exposed to posted workers. Since only the sectoral minimum wages are applicable
to posted workers, their use remains potentially lucrative, especially in low
skill jobs.
EU-induced liberalization thus interacts with different institutionalized models
of capitalism. The original VoC framework does not account for change
particularly well and neglects the liberalizing role of the SMP. This contribution
seeks to address this lacuna. Building on my earlier work on ‘national response
strategies’ to the SMP (Menz 2005), it is possible to analyse the outcomes of
political battles over new equilibria following an external liberalization shock.
Generally, the prevailing logic of industrial relations continues to influence
response patterns. The different varieties of capitalism generate self-preserving
re-regulation. However, in line with Menz (2005) and Kinderman (2005), but
pace Thelen (2000), the German case highlights a somewhat more liberal interest
position among German employers than is often assumed in the VoC approach.
Low-wage posted workers are welcomed in some sectors of the economy and a
general minimum wage is rejected. The article also highlights how ‘Scandinavian
gentlemen’s agreements’ have come under siege and had to be re-calibrated. The
effects of a generally liberalizing impetus are thus far from uniform.
Biographical note: Georg Menz is Reader in Political Economy at Goldsmiths
College, London.
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